

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY

Political Science 287

Guest Lecturer - Mr. Robert Amory

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

I. ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN NATIONAL POLICY

A. Hilsman¹ suggests that our intelligence activities should become "policy oriented". He criticizes the improperly directed efforts of producing daily summaries, periodic estimates of capabilities, and area studies (NIS), which are produced on the intelligence community's initiative, rather than on the basis of specific, actual, and levied problems.

B. Kent believes that guidance becomes rare as the job of intelligence mounts in augustness.²

C. Kent proposes that intelligence might more properly be produced for and utilized by the professional policy planner, rather the political or elected executive.³ Dr. W. Kendall disagrees with Dr. Kent.⁴

D. Ransom makes comment to the effect that representatives of the CIA merely sit as advisers on the NSC and its planning staffs, and are not expected to take positions on issues of foreign-military policy.⁵

- Questions:
1. What is the current role of the intelligence community in the formulation of national policy, and how does it carry out this role?
 2. Is this current role adequate in the view of the intelligence community?
 3. To what extent does the community receive guidance as to the direction of national policy, and produce intelligence to support that policy; or inversely,
 4. To what extent does the community produce intelligence in the absence of national policy guidance?
 5. To what extent is intelligence not considered at all in formulating national policy, as suggested by Hilsman?⁶

II. ORGANIZATION

A. The intelligence community today has basically evolved as an amalgamation of the individual departmental intelligence activities. In this connotation it is a product of circumstance rather than deliberate design, banded together by statute. In suggesting more complete centralization, Ransom believes⁷ that departmental intelligence should be reduced and carefully circumscribed. Admiral E. King in 1945 pointed out⁸ that a single agency for intelligence might, in time, acquire excessive power. He questioned whether such an agency could be consistent with our ideas of government.

III. FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMUNITY

A. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended,⁹ charges the CIA with the function of coordinating the intelligence activities of the community.

B. Kendall subscribes to Kent's views¹⁰ that CIA has inadequate authority to investigate much of the activities of the community not only in the research conducted at home, but also in relations in the field.

- Questions: 1. Does the role of coordinator embody sufficient statutory authority to permit good management control of the community by the CIA?
2. In what manner might the statutes be changed to satisfy Kent's and Kendall's comments in III.B. above, regarding community investigative authority for the CIA? (In this connection one notes that the National Security Act provides for inspection of intelligence of departments by the CIA)¹¹

C. The 1955 Hoover Commission Report recommended establishing a joint congressional committee to oversee U.S. intelligence, with somewhat the same concept as the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. To that end, several House and Senate bills have been introduced, none of which have become law, despite seeming Congressional favor. Opposition to the proposal is generally centered around the security issue. On the other hand, there has been recently appointed (1956) a unilateral "Executive" board of prominent citizens charged with conducting periodically an objective review of the U.S. foreign intelligence activities, and of the performance of the CIA.¹²

- Questions: 1. The CIA already has extensive relations with many Congressional committees, and provides substantial data in connection with its annual budget.¹³ Would the community attain additional Congressional confidence and simplified management supervision by dealing with a single committee instead of the extensive coverage of the present time?
2. Is the U.S. system of "checks and balances" modified by having the Executive Branch of the government "audit" one of its own functions?

IV. THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

A. The product of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), being one of committee and "vote" actions, bears the symbol of compromise.¹⁴

- Question: 1. Other than with the prerogative of dissenting via a footnote, how is the minority view of an IAC member represented at National planning councils? (This assumes that the CIA is not of the minority view.)

B. The public often learns of the "failures" of the intelligence community; i.e., Vice President Nixon's lack of warning in his recent South American trip; Sputnik; MIG-15 jet in 1950; Soviet A-Bomb in 1948, Hungary and Poland, etc.

3. What is the community's ability to communicate with and convince national executives and policy makers of their professional integrity and respectability of product?

C. Forecasting events in terms of specific time predictions, is often dangerous if not impossible for an intelligence activity. (Even the President did not know exactly when the Normandy invasion was to occur in WW II.)

Question: 1. Under what conditions should the intelligence product be a time forecast, and when might it be a conditional or contingent estimate; i.e., if "a", "b" and "c" are the circumstances, then "d" is likely to occur; but if "e", "f" or "g" prevail, then "h" is a probable result?

D. The intelligence product is sometimes said to be slanted in support of some vested interest; i.e., budget request to support certain weapon developments, operational theories, political interests.

Question: 1. How and with what success is intelligence kept free of such biases?

E. The U.S. public and economy are the bas^es of our governmental institutions. Reciprocally, they are dependent upon government for certain support.

- Questions:
1. How can the intelligence product be made accessible to military supporting industry with long lead times, so as to provide weapons capable of meeting current threats rather than old ones?
 2. How can intelligence be made available to selected leaders of public opinion, some of whom may be determined to have a legitimate need to know?

REFERENCES

- 1 HILSMAN, ROGER, JR., "Intelligence and Policy Making in Foreign Affairs", World Politics, October 1952, pp. 1-45.
- 2 KENT, SHERMAN, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 182.
- 3 *ibid*
- 4 KENDALL, WILLMOORE, "The Function of Intelligence" , World Politics, July 1949, pp. 542-552.
- 5 RANSOM, HARRY H., Central Intelligence and National Security, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, p. 203.
- 6 HILSMAN, p. 24
- 7 RANSOM, p. 209
- 8 MILLIS, WALTER, edit, The Forrestal Diaries, New York, Viking, 1951 p. 37.
- 9 U.S., Congress, The National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, Sec 102.
- 10 KENT, p. 101
- 11 Sec 102, (e), PL 253, 80th Congress
- 12 RANSOM, p. 181
- 13 *ibid* pp. 226-227.
- 14 *ibid* Chapt. VI.